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Comments on papers by McNeill 
and Foppa
The origins of language and 
language awareness
WILLEM J. M. LEVELT
Both papers in this final section are about the origins of language. It was 
with great hesitation that I agreed to be a referee, since discussion about 
the origins of language, which are as old as our culture, have mostly been 
absolutely futile and a sheer waste of time. In order to protect its own 
members, the Linguistic Society of Paris prohibited any communications 
about the origins of language in 1866. However, this did not help for long. 
Darwin's The descent of man was published in 1871, and it produced a new 
era of discussion, in which we are still involved.
This century of discussion has, again, taught us very little about the 
phylogeny of language. The main finding, which was certainly unex­
pected in the Darwinian framework, was that all primitive peoples turned 
out to have full-fledged vocal languages. Both the full-fledged and the 
vocal were surprising. If language evolution did develop gradually by 
natural selection, no trace of this process can now be found. A one-step 
mutation, as implied by Chomsky (1968), is biologically untenable in view 
of the complexity of the behavioral patterns involved. The vocal modality 
of all human language was a surprise because the general feeling after 
Darwin was that language must have been gestural in origin. Many 
philosophers, linguists and biologists have argued this long before 
McNeill's contribution to this volume. I mention, for instance, Bulwer, 
who in 1644 called gesturing the 'onlely speech that is naturall to Man',
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also Rousseau (1782), Wundt (1900), and there are many others. Again, 
although gesture is everywhere important in language communication, 
no tribe was ever found where language was essentially gestural,1 in spite 
of expectations to the contrary (see 'observations' made by Kingsley 
(1897) and dismissed by Langer (1942)). There are, moreover, no other 
anthropological sources of evidence for a gradual transition from gestural 
to vocal language in the human species. And the arguments by Hewes 
to which McNeill refers are without force. Tylor concluded in 1878 
that 'The idea that the gesture-language represents a distinct sep­
arate stage of human utterance, through which man passed before 
he came to speak, has no support from facts.' This conclusion is still 
valid.
So McNeill cannot use evolutionary findings as an argument for his 
gestural theory of language origins. Rather, McNeill's phylogenetic 
claims are no more than hypotheses which are exclusively based on 
evidence from ontogenesis and from experimental psychology. The evi­
dence is interesting, but inconclusive, as I will argue in a moment. The 
main point, however, is the futility of such discussions: what can be 
gained by inferences from ontogeny to phylogeny, as long as anthro­
pology leaves us, a century after Darwin, fully in the dark about the 
evolution of human language? Since claims about the phylogeny of 
human language can at best be paraphrases of other empirical findings, 
the only gain is a false suggestion of additional support to such findings. 
And this happens in McNeill's paper where he cites Goldin-Meadow's 
work. She found spontaneous development of gestural language in deaf 
children. McNeill concludes that this 'is consistent with the theory that 
vocal speech overlies an ability for manual communication. When vocal 
speech is blocked the original gestural system remains.' It is, however, 
equally consistent with other theories, notably the one which claims that 
if the vocal channel is blocked, the most flexible alternative will be used 
for linguistic communication. In deaf-blinds, for instance, gesture lan­
guage is also impossible, and a manual-tactual replacement is developed, 
but it seems far-fetched to conclude from this that this must be the 
evolutionary more primitive form of linguistic communication. Since I see 
no evidence whatsoever for McNeill's gesture theory, I need not ask him 
why he didn't deal with the main problem of this theory, namely, if 
gesture is such a natural system, why did the human species switch at all 
to the horrors of a vocal language?
1 It is true that gesture languages have been found, but vocal language is always the main 
mode (e.g. Plains Indians, Amazon Indians, Bushmen, see Stokoe 1974).
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So much for the gestural origins of language. Let us now move to the 
essence of McNeill's paper, his syntagma theory. It says, if I understand it 
well, that the ontogenesis of language is based on the unique human 
capacity to link the articulation system to the system of sensory motor 
representations. In my view McNeill touches an essential point here. The 
fact that humans, and also chimpanzees for that matter (e.g. Premack 
1977), can communicate linguistically about things, states, actions, or 
events not present is in full agreement with present-day cognitive 
psychology, in that one has to suppose elaborate systems of internal 
representation of such things, states, actions, or events. Major experi­
mental evidence for the structure of such internal representations, and for 
operations within such systems, comes from various sources, among 
them from reaction time studies. By the way, this method is -  to my 
knowledge -  not frequently practiced in ethology. This is regrettable in 
view of the high precision by which otherwise elusive behavior patterns 
can be measured.
McNeill stresses the enormous adaptive value of using such systems,
i.e. of being able to perform 'vicarious actions'. This is the ability to do 
internal or covert computations on internal representations, instead of 
having to perform overt actions to check out the consequences of one's 
behavior. If a linguistic signalling system of vocal or gestural signs is 
attached to such internal representations and operations, this would 
allow for very easy transmission of action plans, directions, etc. within a 
community. But again, McNeill comes close to circularity in his exposé, 
this time because of the use of rather ill-defined terms. I would like to 
mention one example of this. McNeill argues that the syntagma theory 
would predict that output integration should coincide with meaning 
integration, and he does not hesitate to add that 'this result has been 
found'. There is much here that the reader has to take on trust. On the one 
hand McNeill leaves undefined what is meant by 'a single meaning 
structure', and how it could be manipulated independently. On the other 
hand, McNeill doesn't tell us what units of speech articulation are. Are 
they related to Ekman's 'punctuation' (see chapter 3.1 above), or to what 
Goffman called 'topical runs' (chapter 3.2 above)? According to McNeill, 
they are not the familiar linguistic units such as sentence or clause, and 
one is left with the impression that they are really those stretches of 
speech that correspond to single meaning units. But this would make the 
argument fully circular. Since Professor McNeill cannot have meant that, 
I would like to ask him to define his constructs in such a way that I can 
understand what is meant by 'this result has been found'. It might
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especially be helpful if he could give reference to empirical work on which 
his statements are based.
In McNeill's paper the articulation system is sketched as a late and 
somewhat arbitrary addition to the system of sensory motor repre­
sentations, and it is left undiscussed. Foppa's contribution is a good 
complement to McNeill's in that it centers around the ontogenesis of 
articulated speech. Foppa starts out by sketching how little ethology can 
tell us about the evolution of human language, especially since it is so 
very different from spontaneously developing communication systems in 
animals. So, Foppa has also to restrict himself to ontogenetic evidence. 
The ethological question as to the role of natural selection shrinks to the 
question as to whether there is a mechanism of Skinnerian shaping in the 
child's language acquisition. Again, the answer to the latter question will, 
in my opinion, tell us nothing about the former, in spite of possible 
analogies. Foppa is wise enough not to try this route seriously.
The main issue in Foppa's paper is the issue of self-correction in 
children's speech. Here, Foppa and his co-workers have developed a 
method which can metaphorically be called 'ethological'. The adult says 
'mhm?', suggesting that he doesn't understand the child, and the child's 
repeat performance is registered. As usual, the method is not really new. I 
have seen similar ideas in a 1914 paper by Bohn, and similar experiments 
in recent papers by Grimm (1975), Stokes (1976,1977), Cherry (in press), 
and Garvey (in press).
I think this type of work is very important: it stresses a rather typical 
human aspect of language acquisition, and it might be of inspiration to 
anthropology, and even to ethology. I will finish my introduction by 
sketching a more general framework for this research, and my question 
to Professor Foppa is whether he agrees to be placed in this pigeon 
hole.
The framework is called 'metacognition'. One talks about metacogni­
tion if there is evidence that a person has knowledge about his own 
cognitive processes. A typical case is metamemory: the person knows 
that he is going to forget and therefore he makes notes, or constructs a 
mnemonic. Meta-activities are very general in humans, and the issue is 
not really different from what philosophers have called 'self- 
consciousness'. Especially Flavell (1976, 1977) and Brown (1977) have 
done empirical work here, and this has led them to distinguish different 
levels of metacognition. The lowest level, which is apparent early in 
ontogenesis, is self-monitoring: making self-corrections, either spon­
taneously, or as a response to specific stimulation. The highest level is
explicit reflection on one's own cognitive activities and products, such as 
explaining how one solved a problem.
Metalinguistic behavior is a special case of metacognition. Foppa men­
tions one higher level of this which he calls 'metacommunication', but 
limits his study to the lowest level: self-monitoring in the child's speech. 
The important question to ask about metacognition is: what function does 
it fulfill in the acquisition of cognitive skills, i.e. in language develop­
ment? Skinner has little to say about this, and Foppa suggests that it 
might help to establish internal standards in a process similar to concept 
learning. One function of linguistic awareness in the child might be to 
shape his internal representations of linguistic tools by vicarious action, 
to use McNeill's terminology. The case described by Weir, and cited in 
both papers, is an example of this shaping of linguistic tools. Nothing 
much is known about the growth and functions of linguistic awareness in 
the child, but I can refer to a book which we recently edited in our 
Max-Planck project-group (Sinclair, Jarvella and Levelt 1978).
Metacognition is probably universal in humans, but detailed an­
thropological work is needed to determine its bounds and cultural varia­
tions. A first anthropological paper in metalinguistics has been written by 
Heeschen (1978); it analyzes the linguistic means by which the stone-age 
Eipo can refer to their own language.
Back to Foppa's specific case: the child says something to the adult, and 
the adult feigns not to understand. The child is aware of the failure of his 
utterance and makes a new one, expressing the same intention.
It seems that, psychologically speaking, linguistic awareness arises out 
of devices for finding faults. These cognitive devices could do two things: 
(i) detect that a fault has occurred, and (ii) specify what sort of fault it was. 
An intriguing analysis of such devices can be found in a paper by Marshall 
and Morton (1978), from which most of the following notions and 
examples are derived.
Fault-finding devices operate both in the production and the percep­
tion of language. Foppa's examples concern production. Normally, the 
child would formulate his intended message and receive feedback that he 
has been understood. No specific awareness needs to be involved. If the 
feedback (or absence of it) signals that the utterance has failed, the child 
will send the same message into his formulating system again, and a new 
utterance arises. This new utterance may differ from the original one 
either through random variability in the formulating system, or through 
systematic attempts by the child to change the structure of his formulator. 
Foppa's cases are examples of fault-detection, but fault-specification can
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also occur in language production, for instance in spontaneous self­
correction, such as: (child, age 2; 2): 'Look, look. A caterpillar . . . helicop­
ter (laugh).' Such self-corrections are frequent in early spech and need 
explanation. In the example, the child becomes aware that the meaning of 
the word his formulator produced (caterpillar) is different from the mean­
ing he intended to express (that of helicopter). One has to assume that the 
child monitors its speech by extracting the real meaning of caterpillar after 
it has been produced, then compares this meaning to the intended mean­
ing and finds the fault. This involves, therefore, a feedback loop and a 
comparison device.
Very clear cases of such early linguistic awareness can be seen in the 
child's perception of language. One example (again from Marshall and 
Morton) should suffice. The child (age 4; 7) comes home from school, and 
enters the very noisy kitchen.
Adult: Did you enjoy yourself?
Child: What?
At this point the child has detected a fault. There was speech input, but 
no meaning-output. The continuation of the conversation shows that the 
child has moreover identified the sort of fault:
Adult: Did you have a good time at. . .?
Child: No, no, say it again!
The adult guessed that the problem was one of lexical understanding, but 
the child's answer makes it clear that his problems were merely acoustic. 
The child was thus able to locate the source of the communication failure, 
showing awareness of stages in the process of speech perception.
What sort of functions could be fulfilled by such metalinguistic devices? 
First, they seem to improve the ad hoc communication, which is certainly 
advantageous. But secondly, they may also have a specific function in 
language learning. The mentioned feedback loop from perceptual parser 
to formulator may be an important channel for the parser to 'teach' the 
formulator, so that the perceptual detection of a fault leads to a perma­
nent change in the formulator. The young child's capability of language 
perception is far ahead of his production competence. Linguistic aware­
ness might help him bridge this gap.
Similar mechanisms of awareness may be involved in the acquisition of 
other cognitive skills as well, and an interesting question for ethology is 
whether such phenomena can also be observed in animals. The closest 
may be the acquisition of skills through play -  play is an outstanding case 
of becoming aware of a tool, be it a physical or a cognitive tool. But could 
one observe the use of meta-devices in the acquisition of a communica­
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tion system? A non-natural case is Premack's effective use of the metalin­
guistic label 'name of' in teaching a language to his chimpanzees. One 
wonders whether phenomena of fault-finding and self-correction can be 
observed in the spontaneous acquisition of communication patterns such 
as bird song.
D. McNEI LL:  REPLY TO L E V E L T ' S  C O M M E N T S
Levelt is skeptical of attempts to reconstruct, however tentatively, what 
may have been the origin of human language activity. He cites the famous 
incident of the 1860s when, for self-protection, the Linguistic Society of 
Paris banned further discussion of language origins. However, there has 
been more than a century of scientific advancement in linguistics and 
psychology since that memorable event, including several developments 
that are regarded as revolutionary in importance; in particular in this 
field, there is the great corpus of Piagetian psychology, and the advances 
of Chomsky and his followers in transformational generative grammar. 
In view of these new developments and others, it seems not amiss to 
examine the problem of language origins anew in a contemporary 
framework.
Turning over the question of language origins, however, merely to see 
if anything new can be said about it, is not a promising line of attack and is 
not my main justification for writing on this subject. Levelt asks 'What can 
be gained?' and my answer is this. Carefully thought out speculations 
about language origins can suggest places where evidence bearing on the 
basic or primitive form of language might be sought. For example, if a 
gestural theory of language origins is plausible, then it is in the gestural 
mode of signal emission that we should search for a graded series of steps 
leading up to language, not only in the vocal mode where this search has 
largely been carried out heretofore (animal vocalizations, birdsong, etc.). 
The value of speculation in this situation, it seems to me, comes from the 
possibility of establishing the prima facie relevance of new lines of inves-
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tigation. Levelt is of course right; we cannot expect such reasoning to lead 
to new  facts about the origin of language, but that is not my purpose and I 
should not wish my paper to be read in that way.
Levelt also raises a number of criticisms of the gestural theory itself. I 
am less willing to defend this theory than I am to try to establish the 
usefulness of considering (in a responsible way) language origins in the 
first place, but his remarks still should not pass without some form of 
comment. I see that I have four points.
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